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I. Introduction
The popularity of social networking sites has grown exponentially over the past decade.
While social networking sites originally allowed individuals the opportunity to contact long lost
friends or new acquaintances, more recently companies have started using Facebook, Twitter,
and to a lesser extent MySpace as a means to distribute information to the public about their
company including products, or recent events. Several prominent companies include links to
these social networking sites on their websites including Pepsico, the Coca-Cola Company, and
Verizon Wireless1. Social networking sites range in use from being simple fan pages2 to
attempts by companies to boost sales.3 These social networking profiles are readily identifiable
because the companies implement their trademarks within its content in order to identify
themselves. Even further, some sites include language indicating that the site is authentic.4
Unfortunately, several imposter profiles have been created that include unauthorized uses of the
trademarks.5

This paper will analyze whether these fake accounts create a likelihood of

confusion among the consumers or initial interest confusion, therefore constituting trademark
infringement, and whether the proprietors of the sites may validly assert a fair use or nominative
fair use defense to the alleged infringement.
II. Is It Really “Brand-Jacking”?
Although not every social media networking site is authentic, a “fake” account on such a
1

Pepsico on the Internet, http://www.pepsico.com/Media.html; Coca-Cola Company on the Internet,
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/; Verizon Wireless on the Internet,
http://www.verizonwireless.com/b2c/index.html
2
Nutella on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/#!/Nutella.Italy?ref=ts; Moe’s Southwest Grill on Facebook,
http://www.facebook.com/#!/moessouthwestgrill?ref=ts;
3
Besty Brottlund, Companies Using Social Networking to Boost Sales, February 19, 2009,
http://www.resourcenation.com/blog/companies-using-social-networking-to-boost-sales/; BestBuy on Twitter,
http://twitter.com/BESTBUY; Dell on Twitter http://twitter.com/DELL
4
Taco Bell on Facebook, http://www.facebook.com/#!/tacobell?ref=ts (Taco Bells states in its information that this
page is an OFFICIAL TACO BELL PAGE)
5
Julian Lee, Squatters Creating Twittering Confusion, April 30, 2009, http://www.theage.com.au/business/squatterscreating-twittering-confusion-20090429-andk.html
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site may be created to steal Internet consumers. These sites can be broken down into four
primary categories: (1) fan sites; (2) parody sites, (3) criticism sites; and (4) “brand-jacking”
sites that intends to lure customers away from the mark holder. Whether the site is infringing a
particular trademark will hinge on which category an account falls into.
A.

Fan Sites

Throughout the world consumers are fanatical about products and/or services, and go to
extremes to express their infatuation by collecting items such as Barbie dolls or Coca-Cola
memorabilia. The advent of sites like Facebook, Twitter, and MySpace has created another
avenue for fans to express their fascination with products by creating fan site dedicate to their
particular interest. Although these sites may employ the trademarks of a company, the sites
often include indications that they are fan created sites to express their passion. Despite using a
Coca-Cola bottle as its profile picture, the fan sponsored page has not been shut down, and
instead, similarly to other companies Coca-Cola has embraced their Facebook fan page.6 Unlike
the Taco Bell fan page that indicates it’s official sponsorship, the Coca-Cola site does not.7
B.

Parody Sites and Criticism Sites

Parody and criticism sites are easily recognized as fake accounts. If information on the
site is satirical in nature or is criticizing recent actions of the company, Internet users should be
on notice that the account is not official sponsored. Rarely would a corporation post information
on a social networking site that would be detrimental or derogatory towards themselves.
Companies are known to falter in their marketing efforts and product development, and society
will take these situations as opportunities to exploit the company on the Internet. Alternatively,

6

The 60 Second Communications Team, Three Lessons from the New Coca-Cola Facebook Page, March 31st, 2009,
http://60secondcommunications.com/blog/2009/03/31/three-lessons-from-the-new-coca-cola-facebook-page/;
http://www.facebook.com/cocacola?v=wall&viewas=1209049848
7
Supra n. 4.
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if consumers are displeased with recent corporate decisions they will also use social networking
sites as a venue to express their discontent. Because Internet users would quickly recognize that
the site is not officially sponsored, despite the use authentic trademarked material, this conduct
would not constitute trademark infringement.
C.

Brand-jacking Sites

The problems with social networking profiles arise when the fake site does not indicate
that that account is unofficial by expressing clear fanaticism, parody, or criticism. When this
occurs, the trademark has been “brand-jacked.” “Brand-jacking” causes confusion regarding the
source of the information and site sponsorship because the site appears to be authentic. This
harms both consumers and the mark holder when consumers rely on the false information
proffered by the imposter. This false information can be regarding recent events, upcoming
products, alleged promotions, or even career opportunities.

Mark holders may summer

irreparable harm that may result in lost sales and a damaged reputation as a result of the false
statements. These sites often aim for such results.
One primary example of “brand-jacking” is the case of Exxon-Mobil where “Janet”
register the Twitter account, ExxonMobilCorp.8 The alleged Exxon representative answered
posted statements regarding drilling initiatives, research and development, greenhouse emissions,
and ExxonMobil objectives.9 The problem arose when “Janet” made statements that the Valdez
spill was not one of the top ten worst oil spills in history.10 Shortly thereafter, when a legitimate

8

Jeremiah Owyang, When Brands Under Fire Step into the Fracas: Exxon Joins Twitter, July 29th, 2008,
http://www.web-strategist.com/blog/2008/07/29/when-brands-under-fire-step-into-the-fracas-exxon-joins-twitter/
9
Sam Diaz, Internet brand-jacking: What can be learned from Exxon Mobil?, August 7th, 2008,
http://blogs.zdnet.com/BTL/?p=9602
10
See When Brands Under Fire Step into the Fracas: Exxon Joins Twitter, supra n. 8.
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Exxon official declared that the posts were unauthorized11, the account username was changed to
Non_EMC. Despite the official announcement that the Twitter account was fake, two events had
already occurred: (1) the ExxonMobil’s trademark had been “brand-jacked”; and (2)
ExxonMobil’s reputation suffered as a result of the posts made on the account.
III. Why “Brand-jacking” Constitutes Trademark Infringement
The fundamental aim of trademark law is to avoid consumer confusion about the source
of products and/or services.12 The requirement for trademark infringement is a “likelihood of
confusion” rather than “actual confusion”.13

For a registered trademark, a trademark

infringement action pursuant to Section 32(1) of the Lanham Act requires the plaintiff to
demonstrate that the defendant is, without the plaintiff's consent:
using, in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy, or colorable imitation of
a registered mark in connection with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or
advertising of any goods or services on or in connection with which such use is
likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... .14
Alternatively, for unregistered marks, Section 43(a) provides are more explicit standard for
likelihood of confusion:
Any person who, on or in connection with any goods or services, or any container
for goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or any
combination thereof, or any false designation of origin, false or misleading
description of fact, or false or misleading representation of fact, which –
(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive as to the
affiliation, connection, or association of such person with another person, or as to
the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods, services, or commercial
activities by another person shall be liable in a civil action by any person who
11

Dwight Silverman, On the Internet, nobody knows you're not Exxon Mobil, August 02, 2008,
http://blogs.chron.com/techblog/archives/2008/08/on_the_internet_nobody_knows_youre_not_exxon_1.html
12
5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.01
13
Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., L.L.C., 360 F.3d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2004) ("To succeed on an infringement
claim, plaintiff must show that it is probable, not just possible, that consumers will be confused."); Parks v. LaFace
Records, 329 F.3d 437, 446 (6th Cir. 2003) ("A 'likelihood' means a 'probability' rather than a 'possibility' of
confusion."); Elvis Presley Enters., Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188, 193 (5th Cir. 1998) ("Likelihood of confusion is
synonymous with a probability of confusion, which is more than a mere possibility of confusion."); Versa Prod.
Company, Inc. v. Bifold Co. (Manufacturing) Ltd., 50 F.3d 189, 200 (3d Cir. 1995) (a mere possibility of confusion
is not enough).
14
15 U.S.C. 1141(1)
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believes that he or she is or is likely to be damaged by such act.15
Although the two sections provide differing statutory language, the standards for
recovery are similar, but Section 32(1) requires federal registration of the mark.16 Under Section
32(1), a federally registered trademark is infringed when its use in commerce "is likely to cause
confusion, or to cause mistake, or to deceive ... ."17 On the other hand, Section 43(a) of the
Lanham Act prohibits the use of any "word, term, name, symbol, or device" or "false or
misleading description of fact" that is likely to cause confusion regarding the "affiliation,
connection, or association ... with another person" or regarding the "sponsorship, or approval" of
goods.18 With regard to social networks, the confusion will likely derive from the source,
sponsorship, or affiliation of the use of the mark. The likelihood of confusion inquiry is based
on whether the purchasing public is likely to believe that the defendants’ products and/or
services are from the same source of the trademark holder’s protected products and/or services.19
Accordingly, in order to establish trademark infringement on social network sites,
plaintiff must prove that the use of the mark was: 1) in commerce; 2) in connection with the sale,
offering for sale, distribution, or advertising of goods or services, 20 or in connection with goods,
services, or commercial activities21; and 3) there is a likelihood of confusion in connection with
the use of the mark and the mark holder has been or is likely to be damaged by these acts. 22

15

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)
Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1046 n.6 (9th Cir. 1999) (stating that
Sections 32(1) and 43(a)(1) embody "the same standard").
17
15 U.S.C. § 1114(1)
18
15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1)(A)
19
Therma-Scan, Inc. v. Thermoscan, Inc., 295 F.3d 623, 630 (6th Cir. 2002) ("In the first and most common type of
infringement, similar marks on directly competing goods or services cause confusion over their origin. This situation
is known as 'palming off,' because the defendant junior user misleads the public about the source of its goods or
services, leading consumers to purchase the defendant's products in the belief that they are buying the plaintiff's.").
20
These are the requirements for §1114(1).
21
These are the requirements for §1125(a)(1)(A).
22
McCarthy §§ 23:11.50, 27:13; McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., 501 F.3d 1354, 1358 (5th Cir. 2007); Lamparello v.
Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 313 (4th Cir. 2005).
16
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A.

“Use in Commerce”

Both Section 1114(1) and 1125(a)(1)(A) require that the use of mark be “in commerce”
in order for a defendant to be held liable for trademark infringement. The history and text of the
Lanham Act show that the phrase "use in commerce" reflects Congress's intent to legislate
pursuant to its powers under the Commerce Clause, rather than to limit the Lanham Act to profitseeking uses of a trademark.23

Moreover, the “use in commerce” requirement is broadly

construed and that the use of the Internet satisfies the requirement because companies use the
internet to conduct business transactions, convey information, and provide services to
consumer.24 Accordingly, the use of a mark on social networking sites would satisfy the Lanham
Act’s “use in commerce” requirement.
B.

Use of the Mark In Connection with Goods, Services, or Commercial
Activities

Courts have noted that it is important to distinguish between the "in commerce"
requirement and the "in connection with any goods and services" requirement.25 Although the
Internet is an instrumentality of interstate commerce and the Lanham Act extends to
unauthorized uses of trademarks on the Internet, any use of the Internet is not necessarily
commercial for the purposes of the Lanham Act.26 Should these two “commerce” requirements
were merged into one, the Lanham Act would be inflated to engulf noncommercial speech.27
Moreover, a review of the Congressional history of the development of trademark laws reveals
that the “use in commerce” requirement of Sections 32 and 43 of the Lanham Act differ from the

23

United We Stand Am., Inc. v. United We Stand, Am. N.Y., Inc., 128 F.3d 86, 92 (2d Cir. 1997)
Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Bucci, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3338, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 24, 1997).
25
Utah Lighthouse Ministry v. Found. for Apologetic Info. & Research, 527 F.3d 1045, 1054 (10th Cir. 2008).
26
Id.
27
Id.
24
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requirement for federal registration of the trademark.28

Because a number of these social

network sites are not engaged in the traditional commerce of selling goods and/or services, the
primary issue is whether the information that they are providing on the websites constitutes
“commercial activity.”
Under current trademark law, information can be a good, and the proffering of
information to others may qualify as distribution of services.29 The New York Times Company
owns a registration for the trademark “The New York Times” for “Daily Newspapers” and a
service mark for the same term for “computer online services, namely providing a wide range of
general interest news and information via a global computer network.”30 Several other news
service providers have similarly registered marks.31 Accordingly, a social networking site that
operates under false sponsorship in order to simply proffer information would constitute
“commercial activity.”
C.

Likelihood of Confusion

The Supreme Court has not addressed the requirements for establishing a likelihood of
confusion for trademark infringement however the Circuit Courts have established their own
relevant factors.32 Although the Circuit Courts have varying standards,33 the analysis under the

28

Rescuecom Corp. v. Google Inc., 562 F.3d 123 (2d Cir. 2009) (appendix).
Lisa P. Ramsey, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Trademark Infringement by Impersonation of Markholders,
Buff. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
30
U.S. Reg. No. 0227904 (Daily Newspaper), U.S. Reg. No. 212086 (computer online services, registered Dec. 16,
1997).
31
CNN has a registered trademark for providing streaming of audio and video in the nature of news, editorial content
and information via global computer networks, U.S. Reg. No. 3569054; MSNBC similary has a registered trademark
for providing information in a wide variety of fields over computer networks and global communication networks,
U.S. Reg. No. 2193398.
32
All thirteen Circuits have their own independent factors that are evaluated in assessing the likelihood of confusion.
33
For the purposes of this paper, the analysis shall be conducted under the requirements of the Second and Ninth
Circuits.
29
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respective factors often yields similar results due to the similarities between the standards.34
When analyzing the factors, no one element is dispositive or determinative of whether consumers
are likely to be confused or not.
1. Polaroid Factors
The Second Circuit addressed the requirements for the likelihood of confusion test in the
landmark decision, Polaroid Corporation v. Polarad Electronics Corporation.35 In its decision,
the court stated that with non-competing products36 the factors determining trademark
infringement are: (1) the strength of [the plaintiff's] mark, (2) the degree of similarity between
the two marks, (3) the proximity of the products, (4) the likelihood that the prior owner will
bridge the gap, (5) actual confusion, (6) the reciprocal of defendant's good faith in adopting its
own mark, (7) the quality of defendant's product, and (8) and the sophistication of the buyers.37
Furthermore, the court noted that "this extensive catalogue does not exhaust the possibilities -the court may have to take still other variables into account."38
In subsequent decisions, the Second Circuit noted that no particular factor is dispositive
in the likelihood of confusion inquiry.39

However, The Second Circuit has declared that

34

5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.02 – Many courts have articulated their own versions of the relevant factors… From
jurisdiction to jurisdiction these factors are overlapping, closely related and, frequently, identical. Indeed, there is
little substantive distinction in the various versions applied by the courts.
35
287 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1961).
36
Although the Polaroid decision initially addressed non-competing products, the Second Circuit has expanded the
application of the factors to include competing goods and services. Sterling Drug, Inc. v. Bayer AG, 14 F.3d 733,
740 n.3 (2d Cir. 1994) ("Originally formulated in reference to non-competing products, the Polaroid test has been
extended to the competing products context as well."); Hasbro, Inc. v. Lanard Toys, Ltd., 858 F.2d 70, 75 (2d Cir.
1988) ("The Polaroid test extends to competing as well as noncompeting products."); Physicians Formula
Cosmetics, Inc. v. West Cabot Cosmetics, Inc. , 857 F.2d 80, 83 (2d Cir. 1988)("Although the Polaroid test
originally was applied to noncompeting products, ... it has been expanded to apply where, as here, competing goods
are involved.").
37
Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Electronics Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 495 (2d Cir. 1961).
38
Id.
39
Playtex Prods. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 162 (2d Cir. 2004) ("When balancing the factors, district
courts generally should not treat any single factor as dispositive ... ."); Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC., 360
F.3d 125, 130 (2d Cir. 2004) ("No single factor is dispositive.").
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although "no one factor is necessarily dispositive, any one factor may prove to be so."40 For
example, in Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner Lambert Co.,41 the court found that the "similarity of
marks" was dispositive and stated:
… in an appropriate case, the "similarity of the marks" can be dispositive and will
warrant summary judgment for an infringement defendant "if the court is satisfied
that the ... marks are so dissimilar that no question of fact is presented."
Moreover, "the evaluation of the Polaroid factors is not a mechanical process. ... rather, a court
should focus on the ultimate question of whether consumers are likely to be confused."42
The Polaroid factors are "merely tools designed to help grapple with the 'vexing' problem of
resolving the likelihood of confusion issue."43
2. Sleekcraft Factors
Similarly, in AMF Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats the Ninth Circuit set forth factors necessary for
determining whether confusion between related goods is likely:44 (1) strength of the mark; (2)
proximity of the goods; (3) similarity of the marks; (4) evidence of actual confusion; (5)
marketing channels used; (6) type of goods and the degree of care likely to be exercised by the
purchaser; (7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; and (8) likelihood of expansion of the
product lines.45 Furthermore, the court noted that the list is not exhaustive and other variables

40

Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2001).
Nabisco, Inc. v. Warner-Lambert Co., 220 F.3d 43, 46 (2d Cir. 2000).
42
Id; Paddington Corp. v. Attiki Imp. & Distrib., Inc., 996 F.2d 577, 584 (2d Cir. 1993); Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi
& Co., 412 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2005) ("Our analysis is not mechanical, but rather, focuses on the ultimate question of
whether, looking at the products in their totality, consumers are likely to be confused."); Nora Beverages, Inc. v.
Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 119 (2d Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) ("When conducting
a Polaroid analysis, 'a court should focus on the ultimate question of whether consumers are likely to be confused.'
In making this determination, a court looks to the totality of the product."); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc. v. Levi
Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 872 (2d Cir. 1986) (holding that "each factor must be evaluated in the context of how
it bears on the ultimate question of likelihood of confusion as to the source of the product").
43
Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. McNeil-P.P.C., Inc., 973 F.2d 1033, 1044 (2d Cir. 1992)
44
Sleekcraft, 599 F.2d 341
45
Id. at 348-49.
41
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may come into play depending on the particular facts presented.46 Moreover, these factors are
intended to guide the court in assessing the basic question of the likelihood of confusion.47
Furthermore, the Sleekcraft factors are used in both competing and non-competing
circumstances.48
Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has stated that the presence or absence of a particular
factor does not necessarily drive the determination of a likelihood of confusion49 and a flexible
application of the Sleekcraft factors is encouraged.50 For example, a plaintiff does not need to
establish every factor.51 The court has stated that "it is often possible to reach a conclusion with
respect to likelihood of confusion after considering only a subset of the factors."52
The Ninth Circuit has explicitly established factors for analyzing the likelihood of
confusion in the context of the Internet. As such the Ninth Circuit has held that the three most
important Sleekcraft factors, commonly known as the “troika” or “Internet trinity,” in evaluating
a likelihood of confusion are (1) the similarity of the marks, (2) the relatedness of the goods or
services, and (3) the parties' simultaneous use of the Web as a marketing channel. 53 Whenever
the troika "suggests confusion is …likely," the other factors must "weigh strongly" against a

46

Id. at 348 n 11; Triumph Hosiery Mills, Inc. v. Triumph Int’l Corp., 308 F.2d 196, 198 (CA 2 1962); Restatement
of Torts § 729, Comment a (1938)
47
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 F.2d 1327, 1338 (9th Cir. 1992).
48
Dr. Seuss Enter., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1404 (9th Cir. 1997) ("The eightfactor Sleekcraft test is used in the Ninth Circuit to analyze the likelihood of confusion question in all trademark
infringement cases, both competitive and non-competitive.").
49
E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo Cattle Co., 955 F.2d at 1338.
50
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 841 (9th Cir. 2002) ("These factors are flexible, merely guiding the analysis
of the overall likelihood of confusion ... ."); Brookfield Commc’n Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1055 n.16 (9th Cir. 1999) (noting the circuit's "repeated warnings against simply launching into a mechanical
application of the eight-factor Sleekcraft test" and admonishing courts to look at the factors in order of importance).
51
Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prod., 406 F.3d 625, 631 (9th Cir. 2005) ("The test is a fluid one and the plaintiff
need not satisfy every factor, provided that strong showings are made with respect to some of them.").
52
Brookfield Commc’n Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1054 (9th Cir. 1999).
53
Interstellar Starship Serv., Ltd. v. Epix, Inc., 304 F.3d 936, 942 (9th Cir. 2002) ; GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney
Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1205 (9th Cir. 2000) ; Brookfield Commc’n Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036,
1055 n.16 (9th Cir. 1999).
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likelihood of confusion to avoid the finding of infringement.54 In circumstances where the troika
does not indicate a likelihood of confusion, the district court can conduct the infringement
analysis only by balancing all the Sleekcraft factors within the unique context of each case.55
a.

Similarity of the Marks

In the likelihood of confusion analysis, the court must look to the use of the marks in the
context in which the general public would see them in the marketplace.56

Likelihood of

confusion depends on consumer expectations.57 If the similarity would cause consumers to
identify the same source, the similarity will weigh heavily in finding a likelihood of confusion.58
Although a side-by-side comparison will easily discern the similarities and differences between
the marks, such an analysis does not focus on whether the consumers will be confused by the
actual market conditions.59 Often times products will not be displayed simultaneously at the
same location, thus a side-by-side comparison will yield incorrect likelihood of confusion
analysis.60 Consequently, the marks should be not viewed to ascertain whether they are similar
in the abstract, but rather if they are so similar that in the particular circumstance a likelihood of
confusion regarding the source or sponsorship exists.61
The weight given to the similarity of the marks will strongly depend on how the mark has
been used. The use of a mark that is identical or similar to a protected mark on a social network

54

Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 942; Perfumebay.com, Inc. v. eBay, Inc., 506 F.3d 1165 (9th Cir. 2007) (holding
that the three Internet factors weigh in favor of defendant eBay, Inc. and finding a likelihood of source confusion
between eBay and Perfumebay.com).
55
Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 942
56
Reno Air Racing Ass'n, Inc. v. McCord, 452 F.3d 1126, 1137 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that "a court does not
consider the similarity of the marks in the abstract, but rather 'in light of the way the marks are encountered in the
marketplace and the circumstances surrounding the purchase'"); Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse
Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 538 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that "the Lanham Act requires a court to analyze the similarity of
the products in light of the way in which the marks are actually displayed in their purchasing context");
57
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’n., 244 F.3d 88, 101 (2d Cir. 2001)
58
Id.
59
Malletier v. Burlington Coat Factory Warehouse Corp., 426 F.3d 532, 534 (2d Cir. 2005)
60
Id.
61
5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.03
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site, such as the account name or other identifying content, will increase the likelihood of
confusion. For example, if the proprietor of a fake account utilizes the name of the company
such as Exxon Mobil within the name of the account or posts images of the logo, this increases
the likelihood of confusion. If, however, the site indicates in some fashion that the account is not
sponsored by the respective company, the likelihood of confusion is consequently diminished.
Some indicators that the account is not company sponsored may include disparaging names
within the title of the account name or images that tarnish the company logo. Therefore, this
factor will only weigh in favor of finding a likelihood of confusion if the site is an impersonation
of the company rather than a site engaging in parody or criticism of the company.
b.

Actual Confusion

A strong indicator of a likelihood of confusion is actual confusion,62 a factor in the
analysis of every circuit.63 Courts often find that the existence of actual confusion weighs
heavily in favor of finding an existence of likelihood of confusion.64

Conversely, in

circumstances where a plaintiff fails to demonstrate actual confusion, such a failure does not
weigh against a finding of likelihood of confusion.65
Actual confusion is difficult to establish because it is difficult to define. One of the
primary question is how long the consumers must be confused. Some consumers may only be
62

5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.04 – Actual confusion has occurred when one or more members of the purchasing
public has seen or heard the defendant's mark and believed the defendant's product was made or sponsored by the
plaintiff.
63
The Restatement of Unfair Competition states: "A likelihood of confusion may be inferred from proof of actual
confusion." Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 23(1).
64
Surfvivor Media, Inc. v. Survivor Prods., 406 F.3d 625, 633 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Evidence of actual confusion by
consumers is strong evidence of likelihood of confusion."); Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439 (2d Cir.
2004) ("There can be no more positive or substantial proof of the likelihood of confusion than proof of actual
confusion."); M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1082 (9th Cir. 2005) (concluding that the
existence of actual confusion is "persuasive proof that future confusion is likely").
65
Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 842 (9th Cir. 2002) ("'Because evidence of actual confusion can be difficult
to obtain, its absence is generally unnoteworthy' and is given little probative weight."); Lois Sportswear, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Levi Strauss & Co., 799 F.2d 867, 875 (2d Cir. 1986) ("It is black letter law that actual confusion need not be
shown to prevail under the Lanham Act, since actual confusion is very difficult to prove and the Act requires only a
likelihood of confusion as to source.").
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confused for a brief period of time until they recognize that the site is fake while in other
instances, consumer confusion may be prolonged for period of days while a site remains in
operation. Because there is no established period of time that constitutes actual confusion, this
factor will require a case-by-case analysis where this factor will be evaluated and met through
the use of consumer surveys66 and declarations from consumers.
c.

Related Goods

In conducting the likelihood of confusion analysis, court will determine how closely the
goods and/or services are related to each other in the minds of the consumers. The closer the
relation, the stronger the likelihood of confusion,67 and thus requires a weaker showing of
similarity between the marks.68 Accordingly, finding that the competing goods and/or services
are unrelated weighs against a likelihood of confusion.69 In determining whether the goods
and/or services are related, the court must consider whether the consumers would associate the
defendant’s goods and/or services with the plaintiff’s.70

66

Barton Beebe, An Empirical Study of the Multifactor Tests for Trademark Infringement, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1581,
1622 (2006) (suggesting that although survey evidence may be highly influential, it is of little importance in
practice).
67
Team Tires Plus, Ltd. v. Tires Plus, Inc., 394 F.3d 831, 834 (10th Cir. 2005) (holding that "use of a mark on a
directly competitive good is more likely to create confusion than use of the same mark on a distantly related good").
68
TMEP § 1207.01(a); Amcor, Inc. v. Amcor Industries, Inc., 210 USPQ 70, 78 (TTAB 1981) (stating that if the
marks of the respective parties are identical, the relationship between the goods or services need not be as close to
support a finding of likelihood of confusion as would be required in a case where there are differences between the
marks.).
69
Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003) ("When the two users of a mark are operating in
completely different areas of commerce, consumers are less likely to assume that their similarly branded products
come from the same source. In contrast, the closer the secondary user's goods are to those the consumer has seen
marketed under the prior user's brand, the more likely that the consumer will mistakenly assume a common
source."); Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1147 (9th Cir. 2002) ("We examine the relatedness of
the parties' goods because the more closely related the goods are, the more likely consumers will be confused by
similar marks.").
70
Brookfield Commc’n, Inc. v. West Coast Entm’t Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1056 (9th Cir. 1999) (in determining
whether the goods are related, a court should ask whether "the consuming public is likely somehow to associate" the
defendant's with the plaintiff's); In re1st USA Realty Prof’l, Inc., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d 1581 (T.T.A.B. 2007) ("[I]t is not
necessary that the goods or services of applicant and the registrant be similar or competitive, or even that they move
in the same channels of trade to support a holding of likelihood of confusion. It is sufficient that the respective goods
or services are such that they would or could be encountered by the same persons under circumstances that could,
because of the similarity of the marks, give rise to the mistaken belief that they originate from the same producer.").
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Here, the resulting analysis may be counter intuitive. When both parties are engaged in
providing related goods and/or services the factor weighs against a finding of a likelihood of
confusion. If a mark holder is an active member of social networking sites that consumers were
previously aware of, then a duplicative account on the same networking site will be suspicious.
Consequently, users may realize that the duplicative site is not sponsored by the mark holder.
Moreover, mark holders can protect their marks by creating social networking accounts and
including links to these sites on their company websites.71 On the contrary, if both parties have
not created profiles, consumers may be confused regarding the sponsorship when the account
appears to be official. Thus, if a mark holder has not joined the social networking scene, a fake
account that appears to be authentic would weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of confusion.
d.

Channels of Trade and Advertising

When the two parties share similar channels of trade and/or advertising there is an
increased chance of finding a likelihood of confusion.72

If parties share or utilize similar

channels of trade the consumers are more likely to be confused. 73 Conversely, when the parties
market their goods and/or services in difference channels, courts often find that it weighs against
a finding of likelihood of confusion.74 The Internet as a “channel of trade” has been subject to
differing standards with some courts finding that the Internet weighs in favor of confusion75

71

Companies ranging from local one office to multination conglomerates have started including links to accounts on
Facebook, Twitter, and other networking sites as a method of promoting their company.
72
M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073, 1083 (9th Cir. 2005) ("Convergent marketing channels
increase the likelihood of confusion."), quoting Nutri/System, Inc. v. Con-Stan Indus., Inc., 809 F.2d 601, 606 (9th
Cir. 1987)
73
Heartsprings, Inc. v. Heartspring, Inc., 143 F.3d 550, 556 (10th Cir. 1998) ("The marketing practices of the parties
are particularly relevant in a trademark infringement case because these practices directly impact the way in which
consumers experience the parties' respective marks.").
74
M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entertainment, 421 F.3d 1073, 1084 (9th Cir. 2005) (finding no triable issue of
likelihood of confusion and finding the channels of trade factor to weigh "strongly" in defendant's favor where the
parties promoted its products in different publications and only one party sold its products in retail outlets)
75
Pure Imagination, Inc. v. Pure Imagination Studios, Inc., 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23064 (N.D. Ill. 2004) ("While
the Court declines to hold that the mere use of the Internet by both parties means that [the "area and manner of
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while other courts find the factor is diminished.76
According to the Ninth Circuit, utilizing the Internet for marketing purposes does not
constitute overlapping marketing channels.77 On the other hand, the Internet is particularly
disposed to leading to likelihood of confusion because an Internet browser may encounter
competing marks simultaneously.78 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit has established factors that
are used to ascertain whether the use of the Internet serves as parallel marketing channels.79 The
court declared that the proper inquiries are: (1) whether both parties "use the Web as a
substantial marketing and advertising channel”; (2) whether the parties' marks "are utilized in
conjunction with Web-based products; and (3) whether the parties' marketing channels overlap in
any other way.80
Although the Second Circuit does not explicitly mention “channels of trade” in its
likelihood of confusion factors, the courts in that circuit address the issue in the context of the
"proximity of the products" factor.81 The courts evaluate the "the class of customers to whom
the goods are sold, the manner in which the products are advertised, and the channels through
which the goods are sold" when analyzing the "proximity of the products” factor.82 Accordingly,

concurrent use"] factor weighs in favor of the trademark owner, under the facts of this case where both parties
actively use the Internet to perform their services, this factor weighs heavily in favor of [plaintiff].")
76
Yellowbrix, Inc. v. Yellowbrick Solutions, Inc., 181 F. Supp. 2d 575, 579 (E.D. Va. 2001) ("[B]ecause the Internet
has become such a prevalent channel of trade, the probativeness of this factor is somewhat diminished in
determining whether there is a "likelihood of confusion" amongst consumers of the parties' products.").
77
Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1151 (9th Cir. 2002).
78
GoTo.com, Inc. v. Walt Disney Co., 202 F.3d 1199, 1207 (9th Cir. 2000).
79
Entrepreneur Media, 279 F.3d at 1151
80
Id.
81
Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LL.C., 360 F.2d 125, 134 (2d Cir. 2004); Star Indus. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d
373 (2d Cir. 2005) (two products sold in the same locations that were frequented by the same customers are in
"competitive proximity"); Streetwise Maps, Inc. v. VanDam, Inc., 159 F.3d 739, 745 (2d Cir. 1998) (the "proximity"
factor "considers whether the two products compete in the same market"); Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp.,
73 F.3d 474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding that factor concerns "whether and to what extent the two products compete
with each other").
82
Playtex Prods., Inc. v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 390 F.3d 158, 162-63 (2d Cir. 2004) (finding the "proximity" factor
in plaintiff's favor where the parties' channels of trade are the same); Cadbury Beverages, Inc. v. Cott Corp., 73 F.3d
474, 480 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding confusion where the parties sell the same products, which are "sold through the
same channels of trade to the same class of customers").
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the inquiries into the proximity of the goods and trade channel are closely related because they
both inquire as to whether the consumers will be aware of the parties’ goods and/or services as
well as their trademarks.
channels.

Competitive goods and/or services are often sold via the same trade

Nevertheless, products that share similar trade channels are not necessarily close in

proximity.83
Most, if not all, companies use the Internet as a means to disseminate information to their
customers. On these official websites, companies utilize their trademarks in order for visitors to
recognize that they are at the appropriate site and are assured that they are such through
recognition of the mark. Moreover, the proprietor of a fake social site uses the Internet to
convey information regarding the company while simultaneously using the company’s mark to
make it appears as if the site is officially sponsored by the company. As such, the first two
elements of the Ninth Circuit’s inquiry are satisfied because both parties are using the Internet as
a marketing channel and are using the mark in conjunction with the distribution of information.
The third inquiry would be largely irrelevant in the case of social networks because the account
registrants of fake sites are unlikely to use marketing channels outside of the networking site.
However, the substantial overlap regarding the use of the Internet as a marketing channel would
still weigh in favor of a finding of a likelihood of confusion.
e.

Bridging the Gap

When considering the “bridging the gap” factor, courts must take into consider the
possibility of a senior mark user entering the junior mark user’s market, or whether the
consumers anticipate such an expansion is likely.84 A trademark owner will not be hindered for

83

Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955, 963 (2d Cir. 1996).
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373 (2d Cir. 2005) ("'Bridging the gap' refers to the likelihood that the
senior user will enter the junior user's market in the future, or that consumers will perceive the senior user as likely
to do so.").
84
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failing to pursue a market, good or service that has already been entered into by the defendant. 85
However, when a plaintiff fails to show that they intend on entering the market of the alleged
infringer, the factor weighs in favor of the defendant.86 Moreover, the plaintiff must demonstrate
a “strong possibility” of bridging the gap in "in the reasonably near future”87 in order to support a
finding of infringement.88
Over the past two decades, the Internet has grown exponentially and its use as a
marketing channel has correspondingly risen as well. As such, the Internet serves as both a
means for disseminating goods and/or services and advertising. Companies have implemented
personal websites as a source of information regarding the companies’ history, current events,
product lines, career opportunities, and an abundance of other information. More recently,
companies have started participating in social networking sites as a means for promoting their
companies. Hence, if the mark holder demonstrates that the intention was to develop a presence
on social networking sites, then this factor will likely weigh in favor of a finding of likelihood of
confusion.
f.

Awareness of Purchasers

There are two general classes of purchasers; sophisticated and unsophisticated. The more
sophisticated the consumer is, the less likely that they will be confused. 89 A court will look to
the lowest level of sophistication when the consumer market consists of both sophisticated and
85

Virgin Enters. Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (stating "the trademark owner does not lose ...
merely because it has not previously sold the precise good or service sold by the secondary user.").
86
Entrepreneur Media v. Smith, 279 F.3d 1135, 1152 (9th Cir. 2002) (holding that where there was no evidence that
the parties intended to expand into each other's product lines, "the district court should have weighed this factor
against finding likely confusion"); Sports Authority, Inc. v. Prime Hospitality Corp., 89 F.3d 955 (2d Cir.
1996) (where plaintiff sporting goods store has no plans to enter defendant's business of restaurants, factor weighs
against plaintiff).
87
Virgin Enterprises Ltd. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 150 (2d Cir. 2003).
88
M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entertainment, 421 F.3d 1073, 1085 (9th Cir. 2005); E. & J. Gallo Winery v. Gallo
Cattle Co., 967 F.2d 1280, 1293 (9th Cir. 1992).
89
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’n, Inc., 244 F.3d 88, 102 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The more sophisticated the
consumers, the less likely they are to be misled by similarity in marks.")
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unsophisticated purchasers.90 The Internet attracts a wide variety of consumers ranging from the
well-advised and technically savvy buyers to the gullible and technophobic. Because of the
diversity of the users of social networking sites, courts will likely look to the lowest level of
sophistication. Consequently, this factor will weigh more heavily in favor of finding a likelihood
of confusion because less sophisticated buyers will be less likely to decipher who is sponsoring
the site.
g.

Defendant’s Intent

Some courts have held that when a defendant has deliberately employed the plaintiff's
mark and intentionally infringed, it has consequently intended to cause consumer confusion.91
A plaintiff does not need to demonstrate that the alleged infringer had bad faith intentions.92
However, demonstrating that a defendant used the mark is bad faith weighs in favor of a
likelihood of confusion.93 Furthermore, the good faith use of a mark will not exonerate an
infringer if it has caused consumer confusion.94 A court must consider whether the defendant
intentionally used the mark with purpose of causing confusion regarding the source of the good
and/or service in order to take advantage of on the mark holder’s reputation.95

90

Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 843 n.9 (9th Cir. 2002) (finding that the "least sophisticated consumer"
standard applies "only when the plaintiff's products or services are marketed to different categories of purchasers,
such as to both professional purchasers and the consuming public").
91
Kemp v. Bumble Bee Seafoods, Inc., 398 F.3d 1049, 1057 (8th Cir. 2005) (Intent is relevant "because it
demonstrates the junior user's true opinion as to the dispositive issue, namely, whether confusion is
likely."); Daddy's Junky Music Stores Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d 275, 286 (6th Cir. 1997)
("Intent is relevant because purposeful copying indicates that the alleged infringer, who has at least as much
knowledge as the trier of fact regarding the likelihood of confusion, believes that his copying may divert some
business from the senior user.").
92
Official Airline Guides Inc. v. Goss, 6 F.3d 1385, 1394 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A party claiming trademark infringement
need not prove intent to deceive because intent is not a necessary element of trademark infringement.").
93
M2 Software, Inc. v. Madacy Entm’t, 421 F.3d 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) ("When the alleged infringer knowingly
adopts a mark similar to another's, we must presume that the public will be deceived.").
94
Dreamwerks Prod. Gp. v. SKG Studio, 142 F.3d 1127, 1132 n.12 (9th Cir. 1998) (holding that "absence of malice
is no defense to trademark infringement").
95
W.W.W. Pharmaceutical Co. v. Gillette Co., 984 F.2d 567, 575 (2d Cir. 1993) (holding that the intent factor
considers "whether the defendant adopted its mark with the intention of capitalizing on plaintiff's reputation and
goodwill and any confusion between his and the senior user's product").
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To put it simply, a fake account implementing a company’s trademark does not create
itself; therefore someone intended on created a fake account. A fake account may have been
created by a devious competitor96 seeking to smear the reputation of the company, a dissatisfied
customers conveying erroneous information in an attempt to taint the company, or even a former
disgruntled employee that is airing out dirty secrets. Demonstrating that the defendant created
the site with bad faith intent “creates a nearly unrebuttable presumption of a likelihood of
confusion.”97 If the mark holder is able to demonstrate that the alleged infringer created the
account with the intent to deceive, a court will likely view this factor in favor of a finding of
likelihood of confusion.
Equally, the defendant’s intent may lead to a conclusion of likelihood of confusion even
if it was not the defendant’s intent to deceive the consumers. If the site’s content implies that it
is operated by a representative of the mark holder and it contains erroneous information, the
consumers may still be deceived because the users may believe the information is coming
directly from the mark holder. For example, if the site contains information regarding recent
negative news or information that may only be obtained from within the organization.
h.

Strength of the Plaintiff’s Mark

The strength of a plaintiff’s mark is indicated by a consumer’s ability to identify the
source of the goods and/or services based upon recognition of the mark.98 Moreover, the

96

Andrew Moshirnia, Brandjacking on Social Networks: Twitter, Malicious Ghost Writing, and Corporate Sabotage,
July 15th, 2009, http://www.citmedialaw.org/blog/2009/brandjacking-social-networks-twitter-malicious-ghostwriting-and-corporate-sabotage (The competitor of a PR firm created a fake twitter account, although the manager
partner of the competitor denied any involvement in the matter.)
97

Beebe, supra n. 66, at 1628.
Star Indus., Inc. v. Bacardi & Co., 412 F.3d 373, 384 (2d Cir. 2005) ("The strength of a mark is determined by its
tendency to uniquely identify the source of the product."); Brennan's, Inc. v. Brennan's Rest., LLC., 360 F.3d 125,
130 (2d Cir. 2004) ("The strength of a mark refers to its ability to identify the source of the goods being sold under
its aegis."); Nora Beverages, Inc. v. Perrier Group of Am., Inc., 269 F.3d 114, 123 (2d Cir. 2001) ("The strength of a
particular mark is measured by the degree to which it indicates source or origin of the product.").
98
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stronger the mark is, the more likely that the mark will be infringed thereby causing confusion.99
The more distinct a mark the greater the protection it is afforded.100 The scale, progressing from
least to most distinctive, and consequently the greater the protection,101 is described in terms of
marks that are: (1) generic; (2) descriptive; (3) suggestive; and (4) arbitrary or fanciful. 102
Furthermore, the strength of the mark can be measured in two ways: (1) inherent strength,
resulting from the mark's degree of inherent distinctiveness, usually measured on the ladder
ranging from unprotectable generic marks to arbitrary, fanciful marks that enjoy the broadest
protection; and (2) acquired strength, reflecting the degree of consumer recognition the mark has
achieved.103 The strength of the mark can be demonstrated by introducing evidence including
length of use, registration with the USPTO, notoriety of the trademark owner in the industry
number of similarly registered marks are, the trademark owner's efforts to promote and protect
the mark, and surveys indicating consumer awareness.104
Empirical study has shown that there is a strong correlation between the inherent
distinctiveness of a mark and a finding of likelihood of confusion.105 Because the level of
protection afforded to a mark varies based on its classification and its distinctiveness, courts will
need to conduct a case-by-case analysis based on each individual mark. Where the mark is being

99

Daddy's Junky Music Stores Inc. v. Big Daddy's Family Music Center, 109 F.3d275, 280 (6th Cir. 1997) ("The
more distinct a mark, the more likely is the confusion resulting from its infringement ... ."); Versa Prod. Co. v.
Bifold Co., 50 F.3d 189, 203 (3d Cir. 1995); Aktiebolaget Electrolux v. Armatron Int'l, Inc., 999 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
1993) ("Strong marks are more easily infringed than weak marks.").
100
TCPIP Holding Co. v. Haar Commc’n., 244 F.3d 88, 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
101
Arrow Fastener Co. v. Stanley Works, 59 F.3d 384, 391 (2d Cir. 1995) (holding that "the strength or
distinctiveness of a mark determines . . . the degree of protection it will be accorded")
102
TCPIP Holding, 244 F.3d at 93 (2d Cir. 2001).
103
Id. at 100
104
5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.10; Borinquen Biscuit Corp. v. M.V. Trading Corp., 443 F.3d 112, 121 (1st Cir.
2006) (finding RICA strong for cookies or crackers where it had been registered for over thirty years, no third
parties had registered that mark for those goods in the United States, and its owner had made efforts to promote and
protect the mark); Kellogg Co. v. Toucan Golf, Inc., 337 F.3d 616, 624 (6th Cir. 2003) (submission of survey
evidence showing that an astonishing 94% of Americans recognize Kellogg's Toucan Sam and 81% of children who
recognize the mark associate it correctly with Kellogg's Fruitt Loops cereal).
105
Beebe, supra n. 66.
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on a social networking site is inherently distinctive and fanciful, courts will grant the mark
holder greater protection.

Furthermore, a stronger mark may cause the consumers greater

confusion regarding the sponsorship of the source and allow them to assume that the mark holder
is the proprietor of the site. On the other hand, a consumer may not be confused when less
distinctive marks are utilized by the mark holder, that can be registered on a first-come, firstserve basis by someone other than the mark holder.
With the plethora of famous mark holders that have created profiles on social network
sites, the probability of a consumer being confused by a falsely sponsored site increases. When a
site provides information regarding the company including a company profile, future prospects,
or current issues relating to the company, a consumer may reasonably infer that a representative
of the company is responsible for maintaining the information and may weigh in favor of finding
a likelihood of confusion. Conversely, if the site is criticizing, parodying, or commenting on the
mark holder’s company, courts should not assume that consumers are more likely to be confused
because a company would not construct a site that would be detrimental to its welfare.106
i.

Quality of Defendant’s Goods/Services (2d Cir.)

Although "the quality of defendant's product" is one of the Polaroid factors, it is does not
provide substantial evidence in the likelihood of confusion analysis, thus proves to be slightly
probative in comparison to the other factors.107 For example, the Second Circuit has declared
that "the quality of the secondary user's product goes more to the harm that confusion can cause
the plaintiff's mark and reputation than to the likelihood of confusion."108 The quality of the

106

Lyons Pshp. v. Giannoulas, 179 F.3d 384, 389 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating “when a consumer encounters the use of a
trademark in a setting that is clearly a parody, the strength of the mark may actually make it easier for the consumer
to realize that the use is a parody.”)
107
Virgin Enter. v. Nawab, 335 F.3d 141, 151 (2d Cir. 2003) (declaring that the quality of goods is not "of high
relevance to the issue of likelihood of confusion").
108
Id.
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defendant’s goods can adversely affect the reputation of the senior mark holder or it may cause
confusion regarding the source.109
As stated above, when a page on a networking site appears to be officially sponsored by
the corporation it is more likely to cause consumer confusion. When a high quality but fake
account distributes false or negative comments that adversely affect the mark holder’s reputation
this weighs in favor of finding of a likelihood of confusion.

Moreover, a site that appears to be

official causes confusion as to the true sponsor.
D.

Initial Interest Confusion

The Ninth Circuit has declared that the initial interest confusion is actionable under the
Lanham Act.110 Moreover, a defendant that improperly uses a trademark to create initial interest
confusion improperly benefits from the goodwill that the mark holder developed in that the
mark.111 However, the Second Circuit has limited the applicability of the doctrine in the context
of the Internet by requiring intentional deception of Internet users because Internet users control
their ability to relocate to a different website.112 With regard to the Internet, initial interest
confusion occurs when a potential consumer encounters a website that they believe to be the one
they were original seeking out.113 The confusion may result from the website having a similar
domain name to the trademark or because meta tags embedded in the site which place it high on

109

Nikon, Inc. v. Ikon Corp., 987 F.2d 91, 95 (2d Cir. 1993) ("We have taken two approaches about the quality of the
junior user's product: (1) an inferior quality product injures the senior user's reputation because people may think
they come from the same source; or (2) a product of equal quality promotes confusion that they come from the same
source.");
110
Brookfield Commc’n v. W. Coast Entm't Corp., 174 F.3d 1036, 1063 (9th Cir. Cal. 1999).
111
Id. at 1062.
112
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004) ("Because consumers diverted on the Internet
can more readily get back on track than those in actual space, thus minimizing the harm to the owner of the
searched-for site from consumers becoming trapped in a competing site, Internet initial interest confusion requires a
showing of intentional deception.").
113
5-5 Gilson on Trademarks § 5.14

22

search engine results.114

Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that the initial interest

confusion may apply even in circumstances where the goods are unrelated.115
Under the theory of initial interest confusion, a calculated misuse of a mark is
infringement if even no sale results because of the confusion.116 On the other hand, the Fourth
Circuit has taken the opposite approach in the context of the Internet and declared that financial
gain is an essential element for imposing liability under the doctrine.117 This approach has been
rejected by several courts, most noteworthy of which is the Second Circuit.118 Under the law of
the Ninth and Second Circuits, the initial interest confusion applies when the mark holder is
harmed when the competitor gains an advantage based on the use of the mark. 119 The mark
holder may endure harm because the Internet users will browse the unintended site it
encountered and cease searching for the original, targeted website.120
Based on the foregoing, courts will likely find initial interest confusion in circumstances
where a third party uses the mark to indicate that the mark holder is the source of the expresion.
When a social networking website contains the trademark and comprises of material

114

Id.
Interstellar Starship, 304 F.3d at 943-44 ("If an apple grower adopts a famous trademark, like www.drseuss.com,
as a domain name, initial interest confusion probably results, even if that business's goods differ significantly from
those of Dr. Seuss. ... Actionable initial interest confusion probably results even if every consumer realizes that
DRSEUSS.com is owned by an apple grower, and no consumer ever consummates a Winesap, Delicious, or Granny
Smith purchase thinking that Dr. Seuss grows apples or endorses, sponsors, or licenses his name to the apple
grower."); Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Computer Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1019 (9th Cir. 2004) (finding no
infringement of automotive company's mark based on defendant computer company's non-automotive-related
advertising on its web site but finding infringement based on defendant's automotive-related advertising); BigStar
Entm’t, Inc. v. Next Big Star, Inc., 105 F. Supp. 2d 185, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y. 2000) (noting that initial interest
confusion "presumably would not arise, or would be minimized, in circumstances where the products in question are
used for substantially different purposes and therefore the merchants are not in close competitive proximity").
116
Dr. Seuss Enters., L.P. v. Penguin Books USA, Inc., 109 F.3d 1394, 1405 (9th Cir. Cal. 1997) (citing Mobil Oil
Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254, 257-58 (2d Cir. 1987)).
117
Lamparello v. Falwell, 420 F.3d 309, 317 (4th Cir. 2005).
118
SMJ Group, Inc. v. 417 Lafayette Rest. LLC, 439 F. Supp. 2d 281, 289 (S.D.N.Y. 2006).
119
Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Commc’n Corp., 354 F.3d 1020, 1025 (9th Cir. 2004) (competitors gain
customers by capitalizing on another company's good will; survey results showed that Internet users searching for
trademarked terms would incorrectly believe that competitors' banner ads were connected to the trademark owner);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Pegasus Petroleum Corp., 818 F.2d 254 (2d Cir. 1987).
120
Savin Corp. v. Savin Group, 391 F.3d 439, 462 n.13 (2d Cir. 2004).
115
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substantially similar to that of the mark holder, Internet users are likely to be confused at first
glance. Although after devling further into the site users may be able to discern that the site
administrator is the not the mark holder, their initial confusion will meet the threshold.
Moreover, as previously dicussed, a social networking site that does not overtly state that it is not
proffered by the mark holder is created with the intent to deceive Internet users. As the
popularity of company networking sites increase, the likelihood that someone may falsely
believe a site is authentic correspondingly increases because Internet users are likely to be under
the impression that more and more companies are joinging the social networking scene. Thus,
the courts will likely find that the intial interst confusion doctrine applies to the unauthorized use
of a mark on social networking websites wherea third party is impersonating the mark holder and
implying that the mark holder is the source of the expressions.
IV. Defenses to Trademark Infringement
A.

Fair Use

One of the nine enumerated “defenses” under Section 33(b) of the Lanham Act to
incontestability is that the defendant is making fair use of the registrant's mark to describe its
own goods and services.121 Accordingly, when a defendant uses a trademark as a non-trademark
description of their products, the defendant may assert the fair use defense if:
the use of the name, term, or device charged to be an infringement is a use,
otherwise than as a mark, of the party's individual name in his own business, or of
the individual name of anyone in privity with such party, or of a term or device
which is descriptive of and used fairly and in good faith only to describe the
goods or services of such party, or their geographic origin.122
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To successfully assert the defense, a defendant must prove: (1) the term or phrase is used only to
describe defendant's products; (2) the defendant did not use the mark as a trademark; and (3) the
use was made in good faith.123
With regard to “brand-jacking” and the use of mark on a social networking site, a
defendant would ultimately fail to satisfy any of the requirements of the fair use defense. First,
the defendant would fail to claim that the use of the mark was descriptive because they are not
actually promoting their own personal goods but rather are proffering information related to the
mark holder and not their own personal company. Secondly, the defendant will likely have
designed the site utilizing the company’s “brand-jacked” mark for the purposes of relying on the
notoriety of the mark and inducing consumers to believe that the mark holder is the sponsor of
said site. Thereby, the defendant would have used the mark for the purposes of using it as a
trademark and failing to satisfy the second requirement. Lastly, the defendant created the site
with the intent of using the mark to represent the company. Whether the use was made in good
faith will hinge on the content of the site. If the purpose of the site is defamatory and degrading
the reputation of the mark holder, then the defendant will likely fail to satisfy this requirement.
Therefore, a defendant would not be successful in asserting the fair use defense.
B.

Nominative Fair Use

Nominative “fair use” is not a statutory defense to an incontestable registration. The
defense has been recognized by courts when a mark is not used to describe the defendant’s
product, but to refer to the plaintiff’s mark, goods and/or services. The nominative fair use
defense is comprised of three factors: (1) the product or service in question must be one not
readily identifiable without use of the trademark; (2) only so much of the mark or marks may be
used as is reasonably necessary to identify the product or service; and (3) the user must do
123
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nothing that would, in conjunction with the mark, suggest sponsorship or endorsement by the
trademark holder.124
The proprietor may not prevail any more when asserting the nominative fair use defense.
Because some information is discernible without the use of a trademark, the defendant could
arguablye operate a site intended to disseminate information about the mark holder without
actually impersonating them. Should the site be a parody, the defendant may argue that use of
the mark is critical so consumers may identify who the subject of the pardoy is. This, however,
only furthers the notion that the mark has been improperly used without the permission of the
mark holder. Rather than promoting the defense of nominative fair use, the assertion that the site
is noticeably fake supports the opinion that there is no likelihood of confusion and consequently
the use is not infringement.
With regard to the extent that mark is used, the defendants are unlikely to establish this
factor. In order to make these sites readily identifiable, the proprietors use the mark to its fullest
extent including its stylized version or logo. Because the sites often utilize the full imagery of
the mark to make them appear genuine, the defendants in these cases are unlikely to be able
assert that they only used the minimal amount of the mark necessary to identify the goods. The
site operator would only be able to satisfy this element if they can demonstrate that they merely
used words identify the markholder.
Defendants may also encounter difficulties regarding the third factor of the defense,
which could ultimately prove to be fatal to the proprietor of the social networking site that
impersonates a mark holder. When sites appear to be officialy sponsored by the mark holder and
utilizes the mark as a method of promoting the authenticity of the site, courts will likely find that
the user has taken action indicating an endorsement from the mark holder. Moreover, the
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appearance of endorsement and use of the mark are a result of the proprietor’s conduct.
Conversely, where the site is obviously not sponsored by the mark holder because it is a parody,
satirical, critical, or otherwise indicative that its not authentic, a defendant will likely be
successful in satisfying the third factor. Therefore, the fair use defense will likely fail because
the third factor is not satisfied when a site appears to be authentic and sponsored by the mark
rather rather than a site that is obviously fake.
V. Potential Solutions to “Brand-Jacking”
A.

Network Operator Shut Down

The most efficient and cheapest mechanism to terminating the use of mark on a social
networking site is to contact the operators of the network and notify them of the infringing use of
the mark.

Many sites have policies against impersonations and the unauthorized use of

another’s mark in usernames, profiles, and general content. If the mark holder has a valid
complaint regarding the misuse of the trademark, the operator of the site will likely demand that
the content is remove or terminate the account should the registrant fail to remove the content.
The operators of the site are more likely to ensure that the content is removed so they may avoid
any claims of secondary liability for enabling a trademark infringement on their network.
B.

Cease and Desist Letters

Many proprietors of the website are “John Does” at first glance but registering the site
generally requires some form of information that can easily identify the individual(s) or
reasonably lead to their identification. Accordingly, when the identity of the site’s operator is
revealed, the mark holder may contact them directly via a cease and desist letter requiring that
they refrain from infringing the mark. The letter should also include language indicating the
official legal actions shall be taken if the account or its content constituting infringement is not
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deleted.
C.

Accept It and Move On

An alternative option would be to tolerate the site and permit it to continue operating.
This decision would be invariably based on the content that the site is promoting. For instance,
if the site’s content is merely a parody or contains information highlighting negative news
regarding the company that is readily accessible through other media sources, a mark holder may
suffer more by expending resources in an attempt to shut down than the site than it would by
allowing the site to remain in operation. On the other hand, if the site’s content is defamatory or
contains false information that would cause substantial harm to the mark holder’s reputation and
well-being, the mark holder should take measures to shut down the site. Additionally, some
mark holders may follow the mantra that “any press is good press” and allowing a social
networking site to remain in operation will only result in benefits for their brand given the age of
user-generated content and word of mouth marketing. Alternatively, the mark holder may permit
the site to remain in operation so long as the account or profile name and its content are changed
to reflect that it is not officially sponsored by the mark holder.
D.

Litigation

As unfortunate as it may be, some mark holders may have to resort to litigation. Some of
these sites may result in irreparable harm to the image of the mark holder or may have cause
actual confusion among consumers that would result in monetary damages. Moreover, some
proprietors may believe that they are entitled to operate their site and refuse to shut down their
operations. Consequently, the only means to terminate the site, if the network operators won’t, is
to seek judicial intervention. Whether the mark holder would be entitled to a preliminary and/or
permanent injunction would be fact specific and is beyond the purview of this paper. Although
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filing a lawsuit may resolve the matter at hand, it may also cause unwanted repercussions as
well. Consumers do not take well to companies filing lawsuits against individuals, particularly
where in the eyes of the public, the individual has arguably done nothing wrong. Filing a lawsuit
may result in tainting the company’s reputation and create the public image that the company is
an overbearing monopoly.
VI. Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the impersonation of a mark holder on social networking sites
will likely be considered trademark infringement. When sites employ a mark and purport to be
an official, consumers are likely to be confused regarding the site’s true sponsorship. However,
if a site implies that it is not authentic either through the account name itself or if the profile
content is a parody or highly critical of the mark holder, a court will likely determine that there is
no likelihood of confusion. Where a site appears to be authentic and would constitute trademark
infringement, the proprietor of the site would not be able to successfully assert either the
statutory fair use or the nominative fair use defense. Although fake social networking account
may constitute trademark infringement, litigation may not be the most effective resolution. Mark
holders should consider alternative means of settling the dispute such as demanding that the host
of the site terminate the account, requesting that the proprietor of the particular account cease
and desists, or allow the site to continue its operation so long as the site makes it obvious that it
is not officially sponsored by the mark holder.
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